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LOWERING THE PRECLEARANCE HURDLE
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 120 S. Ct. 866 (2000)

Alaina C. Beverly*
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in an attempt to
eliminate rampant racial discrimination in voting procedures.' Two tools
used to combat racial discrimination under the Act are Section 2, which
is a plain prohibition of racial discrimination in voting regulations,2 and
Section 5, which provides a unique enforcement mechanism for "covered"
jurisdictions that have histories of discriminatory voting practices.3 Section 5

of the Act prohibits any change in a "voting qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure" without receiving preclearance from either the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.4 Preclearance is allowed under Section 5 if a proposed voting change "does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color."' The covered jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that its
voting plan satisfies the criteria for preclearance under Section 5.6
This Case Note examines a recent Supreme Court decision that
collapses the purpose and effect prongs of Section 5, effectively lowering
the barrier to preclearance for covered jurisdictions. In Reno v. Bossier

*

Reading Group Coordinator and Contributing Editor, MichiganJournal of Race &

Law, Volume 6.
1.
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) ("The Voting
Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a
century."); see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976).
2.
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) ("No voting
[practice] ...shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color ...").
3. A "covered" jurisdiction under the Act is any state or separate political subdivision, such as a county or a parish, that on November 1, 1964 (1) maintained a "test or
device" as determined by the Attorney General and (2) had less than 50% of its votingage residents registered, or voted in the presidential election of November 1964, as determined by the Director of the Census. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 317.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
5.
Id.
6.
See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 478 (1997) [hereinafter Bossier
Parish I] (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 n.18 (1980)).
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Parish School Board 117 the Court determined that Section 5 disallows only
voting plans that are enacted with a retrogressive purpose (i.e., with the
purpose to "worsen" the position of minority voters). The Court held
that Section 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a plan enacted with a
discriminatory purpose but without a retrogressive effect. Evidence of a
Section 2 violation alone will not be enough to prove a jurisdiction's discriminatory purpose and prevent Section 5 preclearance.
By collapsing the purpose and effect prongs of Section 5, the Court's
decision has a number of critical implications for future voting rights jurisprudence. First, the case dramatically transforms voting rights doctrine
by holding that a violation of Section 2-a violation of federal law-will
not prohibit preclearance under Section 5. Second, it implies that Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment constitutional standards may not be
relevant to Section 5 preclearance. Third, challengers will have fewer
avenues available to enjoin a discriminatory voting rights plan. The high
burden of proof once required of a jurisdiction to gain preclearance will
effectively be placed upon that jurisdiction's challengers. Overall, the
Court's interpretation of Section 5 will make it significantly easier for
jurisdictions to gain preclearance of voting changes with a discriminatory,
albeit nonretrogressive, purpose.

The facts of the redistricting process in Bossier Parish I and II are uncontested. The school board of Bossier Parish, Louisiana, was a
jurisdiction subject to Section 5 preclearance requirements because of its
past efforts to "limit or evade" its obligation to desegregate the Parish
schools.8 To equalize the population among the Board's twelve districts
after the 1990 census, the School Board adopted a redistricting plan chosen in the summer of 1991 by the parish's Police Jury, which is its
representative governing body, for the School Board's own election system. 9 This plan (the Jury plan), as applied to the Police Jury, was
precleared by the Attorney General. 0 In the twelve-district Jury plan, no

7. 120 S. Ct. 866 (2000) [hereinafter Bossier Parish II]. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari over the Bossier Parish School Board preclearance issue twice. See Bossier Parish
II; Bossier Parish L This Case Note analyzes primarily the impact of Bossier II.
8. Id. at 880. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing to stipulation agreement).
9. See id. at 869.
10. See id.
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majority-minority districts were drawn." Although proposed early on in
the deliberation process, the School Board refrained from adopting the
Jury plan, instead hiring a redistricting consultant to devise a different
plan. 2 George Price, president of the local chapter of the NAACP, presented the School Board with a second plan that would create two
districts containing a majority of black voting-age residents." Without
addressing the possibility of creating any majority-minority districts, the
School Board adopted the Police Jury plan in the fall of 1992,14 "over
vocal opposition from local residents, black and white alike.""5
The parties to the suit did not agree upon the motives underlying
adoption of the Jury plan. The Board defended the plan based upon its
interest in respecting existing precinct lines and expediency, given that
the Attorney General had already approved the Jury plan. 16 However, the
Board also stipulated that it had "applied its energies for decades" towards
circumventing its obligations to desegregate the Parish schools. Based
upon this stipulation, the petitioners challenged the Board's adoption of
the Jury plan as another defiant tactic to avoid compliance with the Voting Rights Act. 17 Petitioners implied that the Board passed the Jury plan
only in an effort to avoid having to consider the majority-minority plan
proffered by the NAACP.'8
On January 4, 1993, the Board submitted its redistricting plan to the
Attorney General, who objected to preclearance.' 9 The Board filed an
action for preclearance in the District Court for the District of Columbia
immediately after the Attorney General denied the Board's request for
preclearance. 20 The District Court granted preclearance, and appellants
filed jurisdictional statements with the Supreme Court.2

11, See id. A majority-minority district is one in which racial or ethnic minority citizens are sufficiently large enough in number to constitute effective voting majorities in a
single-member district.

12.

See id.

See id.; see also Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 475.
14. See Bossier Parish 1,520 U.S. at 475.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See Bossier Parish II, 120 S. Ct. at 880 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18, See id. at 869.
19, See id. (citing the Attorney General's response that "the Board was 'not free to
adopt a plan that unnecessarily limits the opportunity for minority voters to elect their
candidates of choice'").
20. See id. at 869.
21. See id. at 870.
13.
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In Bossier Parish I, the first appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed the District Court, holding that Section 5 preclearance should not
be denied solely on the basis that the plan adopted by Bossier Parish School
Board may violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.22 The Court further
held that Section 2 evidence may be 'relevant' to a Section 5 inquiry inasmuch as the discovery of a plan with dilutive impact makes it "more
probable" that the jurisdiction effecting the plan also acted with intent to
retrogress., 23 However, the Court remanded to the District Court to determine whether Section 5 purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search
for retrogressive intent.24 On remand, the District Court concluded that
there was no evidence of a discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose,
but it did not reach the question of whether Section 5 prohibits preclearance of a plan enacted with discriminatory purpose. 25 Faced with the
question again after district and circuit court review, the Court in Bossier
Parish H answered its own inquiry by refusing to investigate the Board's
adoption of the Jury plan for a discriminatory purpose beyond any retrogressive purpose. 26 The Court upheld the adoption of the Jury plan by the
Bossier Parish School Board because the plan was not drawn to intentionally worsen the position of minorities in the district.
Writing for the majority in Bossier Parish II, Justice Scalia claimed that
defining discriminatory purpose as intent to retrogress "has value and effect
27
...even when it does not cover additional conduct.,
He believed that a
retrogressive characterization of the purpose prong is beneficial to appellants
challenging preclearance of a covered jurisdiction because when "conduct
. ..has both 'the purpose of x' and 'the effect of x,' the Government need
only prove that the conduct at issue has 'the purpose of x' in order to prevail." 2 Thus, under Scalia's theory, the government is "spared the necessity
of countering the jurisdiction's evidence regarding actual retrogressive effect .... , 29 However, defining 'discriminatory purpose' as 'intent to
retrogress' and defining 'discriminatory effect' as 'retrogressive effect' the
22. See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 485.
23. See id. at 487 ("[W]e leave open for another day the question of whether the § 5
purpose extends beyond the purpose of retrogressive intent.").
24. See id. at 486.
25. See Bossier Parish II, 120 S. Ct. at 870 ("It noted that one could 'imagine a set of
facts
that would establish a "non-retrogressive, but nevertheless discriminatory, purpose,"
but those imagined facts are not present here.' The District Court therefore left open the
question that we had ourselves left open on remand: namely, whether the Section 5 purpose inquiry extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent.") (citation omitted).
26.
See id. at 878.
27.
Id. at 873.

28.
29.

Id.
Id.
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Court essentially collapses the two prongs of Section 5. The Court now
reads purpose so narrowly that dispositive evidence in a preclearance challenge under the purpose prong must reflect a jurisdiction's blatant wish to
effectuate harm on a minority voting community. Such evidence is so unlikely in today's age of sophisticated discrimination that the Court has
effectively read the purpose prong out of Section 5, leaving the retrogressive effect prong as the only recourse for challengers. The practical effect of
the Court's reading is to force litigants to prove that a plan enacted by a
covered jurisdiction has a retrogressive effect.
The holding of Bossier Parish II illuminates an inherent tension between the purpose and effect prongs of Section 5 as they have developed in
voting rights jurisprudence. The Supreme Court drew guidance in Bossier
Parish II from Beer v. United States. ° Beer involved the redistricting of the
New Orleans City Council following the 1970 census. The council designed a voting plan that provided for black population majorities in two
districts but a black voter majority in only one district.31 In that case, the
Court reasoned that "a legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise can hardly have the 'effect' of diluting or abridging
the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of § 5 .32 In
Beer, the Court concluded that, for purposes of Section 5, "the phrase
'denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color' . . .
limited the term it qualified, 'effect,' to retrogressive effects." 33 The
Court held that a Section 5 submission must be approved if it has no retrogressive effect and if the new apportionment itself does not otherwise
3
discriminate "on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution." 4
II
In Bossier Parish II, the Court's narrow interpretation of the purpose
prong of Section 5 rejected the notion that the phrase "abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color" means retrogression when it
modifies "effect," but accepted the idea that it means discrimination
when it modifies "purpose." 3. The Court "refuse[d] to adopt a construction [of Section 5] that would attribute different meanings to the same
phrase in the same sentence, depending on which object it is modify-

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

425 U.S. 130 (1976).
See id. at 136.
Id. at 141, quoted in Bossier Parish II, 120 S. Ct. at 872.
Bossier Parish II, 120 S. Ct. 866 at 872 (citing Beer, 425 U.S. at 132).
Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
Bossier Parish II, 120 S. Ct. at 872.
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ing." 6 The conclusion reached by this limited interpretation of 'purpose'
is that both the purpose and effect prongs of Section 5 only prohibit the
preclearance of a voting plan adopted with an intent to retrogress or a
retrogressive effect.
The Court's limited construction of the purpose prong of Section 5
departs from significant voting rights jurisprudence. In Bossier Parish II,
Justice Scalia offers cursory reasons for distinguishing case law in which
the Supreme Court has given broader meaning to the purpose prong than
to the effect prong of Section 5. For example, in Richmond v. United
States, 37 the city of Richmond requested preclearance of a proposed annexation that would have reduced the black population of the district
from fifty-two percent to forty-two percent.38 In that case, the District
Court held that "the invidious racial purpose underlying the annexation
had not been eliminated since no objectively verifiable, legitimate purpose for annexation had been shown .

. . . "9

Justice White, writing for

the Court, held that "an annexation reducing the relative political
strength of the minority race in the enlarged city as compared with what
it was before the annexation is not a statutory violation as long as the
post-annexation electoral system fairly recognizes the minority's political
potential." ° The Court stated that official action "taken for the purpose of
discriminatingagainst Negroes on account of their race has no legitimacy at

all under our Constitution or under the statute. 4 1 Moreover, "[ain annexation proved to be of this kind and not proved to have a justifiable4
basis is forbidden by § 5, whatever its actual effect may have been or may be.", 1
Justice Scalia acknowledged this language in Bossier Parish II, but described the once-broad interpretation of 'purpose' in Richmond as
"nothing more than an ex necessitate limitation upon the effect prong in
the particular context of annexation ....",43

36. Id. (citing Bank America Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 129 (1983)).
37. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
38. See id. at 372.
39. Id. at 367 (citation omitted) The Court also accounted for the fact that the annexation did not "effectively eliminate or sufficiently compensate for the dilution of the
black voting power .. " Id.
40. Id. at 378; see also id. at 371 (concluding that an annexation does violate Section 5
"as long as the ward system fairly reflects the strength of the Negro community as it exist[ed] after the annexation").
41. Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
43. Bossier Parish II, 120 S.Ct. at 873. It should be noted that Justice Scalia sees annexation cases as "exception[s] to normal retrogressive effect principles," not as part and
parcel of a broader reading of purpose principles. Id.
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In another annexation case, City of Pleasant Grove v. United States,"
the Supreme Court once again read the purpose prong expansively. In
Pleasant Grove, the Court held that Pleasant Grove, Alabama acted with
a discriminatory purpose by annexing two parcels of land inhabited by
Whites while refusing to annex adjacent Black neighborhoods that had
petitioned for inclusion.45 Pleasant Grove claimed that its action was
permissible because there were no Black voters in the city at the time
of annexation. Therefore, the annexations could not have caused an
impermissible effect on black voting.6 Justice Scalia joined the majority's
reasoning that a discriminatory purpose under Section 5 may relate to
"anticipated as well as present circumstances. 4 7 The Court also rejected
the proposition that Pleasant Grove's action could not be evidence of4a
discriminatory purpose simply because it had no impermissible effect.
Thus, Pleasant Grove also supports a disjunctive reading of the purpose
and effect prongs of Section 5.
Although Miller v. Johnson 9 is not heralded as a victory for minorities in voting rights case law, it is an example of a non-annexation case
where the Court extended the discriminatory purpose prong of Section
5 beyond retrogressive intent.0 Miller v. Johnson was a suit brought by
White plaintiffs who claimed that Georgia's congressional reapportionment scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. s" In considering the equal protection claim, the Court
investigated Georgia's preclearance process. Georgia's reapportionment
scheme was drawn because according to the 1990 census, Georgia was
entitled to an additional eleventh congressional seat. The General Assembly's voter plans, each including two majority-minority districts,
were refused preclearance twice." The Department of Justice relied on
the fact that Georgia had chosen not to enact an alternative plan drawn
by the ACLU that proposed three majority-minority districts in light of

44.
45.
46.

479 U.S. 462 (1987).
See id. at 466, 472.
See id. at 471.

47.

Id.

48.

See id.

49. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
50. Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg support this in their partial dissent in Bossier
Parish L See 520 U.S. at 496-97 ("The [Bossier Parish I]Court indicated that an ameliorative plan would run afoul of the § 5 purpose test if it violated the Constitution.").
51.
52.
53.

See Miller, 515 U.S. at 909.
See id. at 906.
See id. at 906-07.
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Georgia's twenty-seven percent Black population. The Department
of Justice concluded that Georgia's choice of a reapportionment plan
that did not maximize the minority voting interest evidenced a forbidden Section 5 discriminatory purpose.5 5
6
The Court rejected the Justice Department's argument in Miller,1
but the reason that the majority gave belies a broader interpretation of
Section 5's purpose prong. The Court reasoned that "[t]he State's policy
of adhering to other districting principles instead of creating as many
majority-minority districts as possible does not support an inference" of
an unlawfil discriminatory purpose. 7 This statement clearly indicates that the
Miller Court viewed discriminatory purpose as more that just retrogression.
Justice Breyer remarked in his concurrence in Bossier Parish I:
if the only relevant purpose [in Miller] were a retrogressive purpose, this reasoning, with its reliance upon
traditional districting principles, would have been beside
the point ....
Indeed, the Court indicated that an ameliorative plan would run afoul of the § 5 purpose test if it
violated the Constitution. 8
This reading of Miller is critical because it not only shows that the
Court's interpretation of purpose has extended beyond a purely retrogressive purpose, but it also illuminates the Court's reliance on the
import of constitutional standards to interpreters of discriminatory
purpose under Section 5.
A collapsed reading of the purpose and effects prongs is also at
odds with Beer's invitation for the Court to look to constitutional
standards when interpreting Section 5.59 In Beer, the Court cited
Fourteenth Amendment cases, including Fortson v. Dorsey,6° Burns v.

54. See id. at 907.
55. See id. at 924.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 496-97 (citation omitted).
59. For a detailed discussion of this theory, see Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. REV. 189, 193-210 (1983).
60. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). This case involved an equal protection challenge to Georgia's
multi-member election system. The Georgia statute apportioned the state's 54 senatorial seats
among 54 senatorial districts drawn along existing county lines. However, where there was
more than one district in a county, the statute provided that all the county's senators were to
be elected by a countywide vote. See id. at 434-35. In its reasoning, the Court considered
issues of candidate responsiveness to the minority community. The Court held that absent
population disparities among districts in the county's population, or evidence supporting an
assertion that the purpose of the scheme was to dilute the minority vote, equal protection
was not violated by a hybrid system in which some counties used multi-member elections
and others elected only one senator. See id. at 436-38.
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Richardson,6' Whitcomb v. Chavis, 62 and White v. Register63 as standards
against which a Section 5 violation should be judged. 64 The cases recognize
several factors beyond retrogression that can be considered in determining
voter dilution. 6' These principles were catalogued in Zimmer v. McKeithen," an en banc Fifth Circuit decision, as evidence of discriminatory
purpose in a vote dilution inquiry. The "Zimmer factors" command:
[W]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the
process of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy
61.
384 U.S. 73 (1966). Burns involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Hawaii's legislative apportionment scheme. The Court held that the legislature's use of
multimember districts in its interim reapportionment plan does not constitute invidious
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id. at 88.
62. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). Residents of Marion and Lake Counties, Indiana, challenged state statutes establishing Marion County as a multi-member district. The
petitioners claimed that the laws diluted the votes of African Americans and poor persons
living in the "ghetto area" of Marion County. Id. at 128-29. The case established that in
constitutional voter dilution cases it is the plaintiffs' burden to produce evidence that its
members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the
political process. See SAMUEL ISSACHARoFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES,
THE LAW oF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCEss 374 (1998).
63. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). This case involved a reapportionment plan for the Texas
House of Representatives that provided for 150 representatives to be selected from 79
single-member districts and 11 multimember districts, resulting in a 9.9% population disparity between the smallest- and largest-drawn districts. The plan was challenged on the
basis that the state failed to justify the population variations and that use of multimember
districts in two counties unconstitutionally diluted the votes of African Americans and
Mexican Americans. See id. at 758-59. Considering a history of discrimination, the number of minorities elected, the responsiveness of elected officials, and cultural and language
barriers to accessing the political process, the Court unanimously found that the multimember districts unconstitutionally diluted the votes of African Americans and Mexican
Americans. See id. at 766-70.
64. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142-43 n.14 (1978).
65. See Motomura, supra note 59, at 196-97 (including racially polarized voting,
history of racial discrimination, historical lack of minorities elected and the relationship
between socioeconomic status and political participation). See generally ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN, & PILDES, supra note 62, at 385-87 (discussing the development of the meaning of
purpose in voter dilution cases).
66. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
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underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large
districting, or the existence of past discrimination in general
precludes the effective participation in the election system, a
strong case is made.67
The Attorney General consistently has incorporated these Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment vote dilution standards when objecting
to reapportionment schemes that have discriminatory purposes. 8 Thus,
the Bossier Parish I Court's interpretation of purpose, limited to retrogression, is at odds with Beer's invitation to import constitutional vote
dilution standards into Section 5 analysis.
Beer's emphasis on only retrogressive effect can be viewed as a temporal aberration in voting rights jurisprudence. The standard in Beer was
retrogressive effect because, at the time of the case, the law was unclear as
to whether discriminatory purpose was an essential element for a claim of
unconstitutional racial vote dilution. Beer predates cases like Washington v.
Davis,69 City of Mobile v. Bolden,70 and their progeny, which developed the
definition of discriminatory purpose in Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. 7 Three years after Beer, the Court concluded
that a finding of discriminatory purpose requires a showing that "the decision maker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effect upon
an identifiable group., 72 While Bolden sets a high standard for discriminatory purpose, its definition cannot be reconciled with a definition of
discriminatory purpose limited to retrogression. Thus, the reading of purpose in Bossier Parish II is inconsistent with the emphasis on, and
definitions of, discriminatory purpose that developed after Beer.
It could be argued that Bolden articulated a constitutional definition
of discriminatory purpose, while Bossier Parish School Board is confined to
a statutory interpretation of discriminatory purpose. However, it is implausible to suggest that Congress's intent in enacting the Voting Rights
Act was to move so far astray of constitutional protections. The legislative
history of the Voting Rights Act evidences Congress's goal of enabling
the Act to achieve the full aspirations of the Fifteenth Amendment for

67. Id. at 1305.
68. See Motomura, supra note 59, at 245.
69. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
70. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
71. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (holding that a disproportionate impact
on a racial group, by itself, is not necessarily evidence of a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65 (concluding that only a finding of discriminatory
intent can result in a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment).
72. Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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African American voters.73 At the time of the passage of the Voting
Rights Act, Congress was confronted with systematic evasion of the voting rights statutes of 1957, 7 1960, 75 and 1964:76
The judicial process affords those who are determined to
resist plentiful opportunity to resist. Indeed, even after apparent defeat, resisters seek new ways and means of
discriminating. As the case-by-case approach required too
many human resources and often caused no change in result, it was unsatisfactory. 7
A retrogressive reading of the purpose prong of Section 5 contradicts
the creative goals of Congress in including the section in the Voting
Rights Act. In the words of Justice Souter, Congress' goal in including
Section 5 was the elimination of discrimination:
This evil in Congress's sights was discrimination, abridgment of the right to vote, not merely discrimination that
happens to cause retrogression, and Congress's intent to
frustrate the unconstitutional evil by barring a replacement
scheme of discrimination from being put into effect was not
confined to any one subset of discriminatory schemes. 8
73. See H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 6-7 (1965); see also S. REP. No. 94-295, at 11
(1975).
74. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 empowered the Attorney General to institute suits
to protect against the deprivation of the right to vote based upon race or color, as well as
to protect against threats or intimidation that interfered with the right to vote in federal
elections. See H.R. REp. No. 89-439, pt. 1, at 9 (1965).
75. The Civil Rights Act of 1960 empowered the Attorney General to inspect
documents in custody of local voting registrars, and authorized that when a pattern or
practice of discrimination was found in a particular area, a nonregistered African American resident could apply directly to the Federal court or a Federal voting referee for an
order certifying him or her to vote. See id.
76. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
provided for the expedition of voting suits . . . before a three-judge district court with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The 1964 statue
also prohibited (i) the use of voting qualifications, practices, and standards
different from those applied in the past under such law to other individuals; (ii) the rejection of applicants because of immaterial errors or
omissions made by applicants filling out registration forms; and (iii) the
use of literacy tests as a qualification for voting unless they are administered can conducted wholly in writing.
Id.
77. See H.R. RP. No. 89-439, pt. 1, at 9-10 (1965).
78. Bossier Parish II, 120 S. Ct. at 889 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter sees this
issue as a misinterpretation of "abridgment" rather than as a misinterpretation of
"purpose." See id.
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In light of Congress' intent in including Section 5 in the enforcement of the proactive Voting Rights Act, it is untenable to suggest that
Section 5 was designed only to prevent backsliding. Further, a conjunctive reading of the purpose and effect prongs does not align with
traditional methods of statutory interpretation. "Since the Act is an exercise of congressional power under Section 2 of that Amendment ...the
choice to follow the Amendment's terminology is most naturally read as
carrying the meaning of the constitutional terms into the statute., 79 The
language in the Act denotes Congress's standard for Section 5, which is
that of the Fifteenth Amendment: "[t]he right of citizens ...to vote shall
not be denied or abridged... on account of race or color ....,,W A plain
reading of this language in Section 5 shows that one purpose forbidden
by the statute is a purpose to act unconstitutionally.8 Thus, the
"constitutional import" interpretation, introducing Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment standards into the purpose prong, is a plausible
reading of the meaning of Section 5.
III
The Court's holding in Bossier Parish IIhas significant implications
for post-2000 census redistricting. By concluding that Section 2 violations
will not prohibit Section 5 preclearance, 2 the Court creates an unorthodox understanding of Section 5. In effect, the Court is saying that a
violation of federal law is not enough to prevent preclearance of a jurisdiction under the Voting Rights Act.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was designed to prohibit voting
practices that "minimize or cancel out the voting strength and political
effectiveness of minority groups." 3 A voting practice violates Section 2 if,
"based on the totality of the circumstances," the voting process is "not
equally open" to minorities, in that minorities "have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representative of their choice. '"
In Bossier Parish II, the Court interprets Section 5 as a tool to freeze
election procedures, combating only retrogressive effects." Unlike
79. Id. at 887 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325-27 (1966);
United States v. Kozninski, 487 U.S. 931, 945 (1988)).
80. U.S. Const. Amend. XV, § 1, quoted in Bossier Parish II, 120 S.Ct. 887 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
81. See Bossier ParishII, 120 S. Ct. at 895 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
82. See Bossier Parish1, 520 U.S. at 485.
83. Id. at 479 (citing S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982)).
84. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
85. See Bossier ParishII, 120 S.Ct. at 876.
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Section 2 jurisprudence, a retrogressive emphasis in Section 5 requires a
determination of a jurisdiction's status quo. The Court explained that
retrogression, by definition, requires a comparison of a jurisdiction's new
voting plan with its existing plan, and necessarily implies that the jurisdiction's existing plan is the benchmark against which the 'effect' of
voting changes is measured. s6 In contrast, Section 2 uses as its benchmark
for comparison in vote dilution claims a hypothetical, undiluted plan.87
By focusing upon retrogressive effect for Section 5, the Court has ruled
that covered jurisdictions have no responsibility to even consider hypothetical plans that would maximize the voting potential of minority
voters. This understanding of Section 5, combined with an implicit rejection of the "constitutional import" interpretation, places Section 5 in
doctrinal isolation from the rest of voting rights jurisprudence. Such an
interpretation turns the section into little more than a perfunctory administrative process that entrenches the status quo.
Congress expressed its will for Section 2 to bear relevance upon
Section 5 preclearance. The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act
of 196588 instructed the Attorney General to withhold Section 5 preclearance in light of a clear Section 2 violation. 9 This mandate aligns with the
Attorney General's history of objecting to preclearance based upon potential Section 2 violations and unconstitutional voter-dilution. After
Bossier Parish II, the Attorney General's incorporation of Section 2 and
constitutional voter dilution standards to administer preclearance will not
be a hurdle for recalcitrant district authorities] ° Although the Attorney
General's determination is not reviewable, a declaratory judgment by the
District of Columbia District Court will override the Attorney General's
decision. 9 In the past, few jurisdictions have sought preclearance after an

86. See id. at 874.
87. See id.
88. See Bossier Parish 1, 502 U.S. at 503, citing 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973 et seq.
89. See id. at 502 n.4 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2) (1996) ("In those instances in
which the Attorney General concludes that.., a bar to implementation of the change is
necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended section 2, the Attorney General shall
withhold Section 5 preclearance.")).
90. As previously noted, Section 5 provides two alternatives to preclearance: the
administrative authority of the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment action by the
District Court of the District of Columbia. See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN, & PiLDES, supra
note 62, at 313, 329.
91. See id. at 329.
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objection has been imposed,92 making the D.C. District Court an alternative that takes a more circumscribed reading of Section 5.
This alternate path and the Court's refusal to defer to the Attorney
General's discretion raise separation of powers concerns. By casting its
own interpretation of the purpose prong as distinct from Section 2, the
Supreme Court has ignored a constitutionally valid congressional construction of "purpose" for use by the executive branch. This tension is
likely to play out in the approaching wave of 2000 census redistricting, as
the Attorney General's traditional preclearance standards will conflict
with the more lenient standards for preclearance imposed by Bossier Parish
II.
The decision limits the remedies that will be available to minority
communities claiming discrimination in apportionment. Following Bossier
Parish II, communities alleging discriminatory purpose will be forced to
resort to the other arms of the Voting Rights Act, including Section 2, or
to the Constitution itself to challenge discriminatory voting plans. For
any of these claims, the private plaintiff suffers the burden of proof.93
Finally, the holding of Bossier Parish II effectively shifts the burden in
Section 5 cases. The purpose of Section 5 was to place a high burden on
the jurisdiction seeking preclearance, given their histories of avoiding
compliance with voting rights laws:
Section 5 was a response to a common practice iia some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by
passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old
ones had been struck down. That practice had been possible
because each new law remained in effect until the Justice
Department or private plaintiffs were able to sustain the
burden of proving that the new law, too, was discriminatory.... Congress therefore decided, as the Supreme Court
held it could, 'to shift the advantage of time and inertia
from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim,' by 'freezing
election procedures in the covered areas unless the changes
can be shown to be nondiscriminatory.94

92. See id.
93. A plaintiff claiming vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act must
establish that (i) the racial group is sufficiently large and geographically compact (ii) the
group is politically cohesive (iii) and White racial block voting. The plaintiff must also
demonstrate that the totality of the circumstances supports a finding of vote dilution. See
Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. at 480 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986);
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011 (1994)).
94. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1978) (citing H.R. REP,. No. 94-196,
pt.1, at 57-58 (1975)).

SPRING 2000]

Lowering the PreclearanceHurdle

709

The holding of Bossier Parish II lowers the burden of a jurisdiction
seeking Section 5 preclearance to such an extent that the Court has practically shifted "'the advantage of... 'inertia'"g back to the violating
jurisdiction. By requiring only that a requesting jurisdiction refute that its
plan was enacted with the intention to place minorities in a worse position, the Court has designed a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
jurisdiction's districting body. The pervasiveness of sophisticated forms of
discrimination in today's society almost guarantee that even a violating
jurisdiction will meet the low preclearance burden of Bossier Parish II,
unless it is an "incompetent retrogessor. '' % Thus, the Court has placed the
burden upon the state or private plaintiff to prove that a jurisdiction is in
violation of Section 5, thereby removing the heavy burden that Congress
intended for covered jurisdictions to bear.
CONCLUSION
The latest installment of Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board lends itself
to the question: where will voting rights go in the year 2000? In light of
voting right precedent, the dictates of Beer, and congressional purpose,
the Court's collapsed reading of the purpose and effect prongs of Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act thrusts challengers of a preclearance process
into uncharted legal territory. The Court has abandoned discriminatory
purpose for a retrogressive touchstone.
Perhaps Bossier Parish II is part of the recent Supreme Court trend of
cutting back on the expansive notion of voting strength that the Clinton
administration's Department of Justice has developed,97 expressing the
Court's hesitancy to impose on jurisdictions the affirmative duty to
maximize minority voting strength.98 The Court avoids weighing the
manner in which a jurisdiction with a history of discrimination, seeking
preclearance, may intentionally deny minority voters full opportunity to
participate in the voting process by refusing to increase their voting
95. Id.
96. Bossier Parish II, 120 S. Ct. at 873 (quoting Reply Brief for Federal Appellant 9).
97. The Center for Individual Rights, a conservative public interest law firm that
represented Bossier Parish, said that the decision had "effectively ended the Clinton Justice Department's efforts to force localities to racially gerrymander under the Voting
Rights Act." Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say Redistricting Need Only Prevent Backsliding,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2000, at A18.
98. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) (stating that the use of
race as a predominant factor in reapportionment should be presumed to be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 642-43 (1992) (requiring strict scrutiny whenever race is the predominant
factor, to the submergence of traditional redistricting principles, in the redistricting process).
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strength. Instead, the holding of Bossier Parish II entrenches the status quo
and effectively reads the purpose prong out of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. In the future, this case will place the burden upon challengers
of preclearance to prove retrogression or to use avenues other than Section 5 to make a claim that a redistricting plan is discriminatory. Armed
with the circumscribed reading of purpose in Bossier Parish II, jurisdictions will probably look to the District of Columbia District Court for
vindication, making it easier for covered jurisdictions to bound over the
one-time nearly insurmountable hurdle of Section 5.

